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BRENTANO’S PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC AND THE
BASIS OF TWARDOWSKI’S THEORY OF PRESENTATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely known that Kasimir Twardowski was a student of Franz
Brentano.1 In view of the fact that Brentano generally had great im-
pact through his lectures, especially during his Vienna period (1874-
1895),2 and consequently became one of the towering figures of Aus-
trian philosophy,3 it is a matter of no small interest to determine how
he influenced Twardowski. There are, however, difficulties in exam-
ining the relationship of Twardowski to his teacher, as there are in
the case of the relationships between Brentano and his students gen-
erally.4 The main obstacle to this endeavor lies in the fact that Brentano
published very little during his lifetime. Moreover, what has been pub-
lished posthumously is far from adequate in terms of both the quantity
of texts and the quality of editing. For this reason it is highly desir-
able to discuss Brentano in relation to his students by drawing upon his
hitherto unpublished manuscripts. This is the strategy that I will pursue
in the following analysis of Brentano and Twardowski on the topic of
presentations (Vorstellungen).5
2. BRENTANO ON PRESENTATIONS
The main source for Brentano’s psychology is his most significant pub-
lication, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.6 Aside from this, one
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of his most important lecture courses in psychology, namely the one
on “psychognosy” from the winter semester 1890/91, has been pub-
lished.7 While the latter is by no means a critical edition, it is certainly
an improvement over previous editions of materials from Brentano’s
manuscripts. In addition to these two works, however, other material
on psychology is of considerable importance in relation to the topic
of presentations. But aside from the material on psychology, there is
one absolutely crucial manuscript on logic originally from the winter
semester 1869/70 and repeatedly revised in the Vienna period. I’ll first
consider presentations as they are described in Brentano’s psychology
and then proceed to discuss Brentano’s account of the latter in his logic.
2.1. Presentations in Brentano’s Psychology
As is familiar from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano
regards presentations as a class of psychical phenomena.8 Generally
speaking, a psychical phenomenon is involved in any instance of inten-
tional reference or relation to an object or content.9 Whenever some-
thing is imagined, desired, perceived, or is in some way an object of
consciousness, the phenomenon that thereby takes place is a psychical
one. Physical phenomena such as colors and tones, by contrast, do not
exhibit such relations to objects. Since presentations are in all cases
presentations of objects, they are accordingly psychical phenomena for
Brentano. While Brentano also identifies two other classes of psychi-
cal phenomena, namely judgments (Urteile) and love and hate (Liebe
und Haß), he assigns to presentations a special status insofar as he re-
gards them as the basis (Grundlage) for all other psychical phenom-
ena.10 Hence, judgment about a certain object is possible only because
the judgment is based on a presentation of the object in question. The
same goes for love and hate. It is possible to love or hate only that
which one is presented with. This founding character of presentations
is so important for Brentano that he even proposes it as providing an
alternative criterion for distinguishing psychical phenomena from phys-
ical ones: psychical phenomena are either presentations or phenomena
which are based on presentations.
The rest of what Brentano has to say in the published text of Psy-
chology from an Empirical Standpoint is primarily restricted to the thesis
that judgments may not be regarded merely as combinations of presen-
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tations.11 While it is tempting to consider a judgment such as “A tree is
green” as a combination of the presentation of a tree and the presen-
tation of green, it is possible to present a green tree without engaging
in any judgment at all about it. Accordingly, Brentano insists that in
judgment there is something in addition to mere presentations. This
additional element is to be found in two attitudes : accepting (Anerken-
nen) and rejecting (Verwerfen), a contrast which he most emphatically
only finds among judgments.12 The act of presenting for him does not
exhibit any such contrast, nor do acts such as loving and hating.13
Further considerations on the topic are to be found in a volume that
misleadingly announces itself as if it were a continuation of Psychology
from an Empirical Standpoint.14 However it consists of materials from
much later dates which were not intended by Brentano to be continu-
ations of the earlier work. As it turns out, in Brentano’s Nachlass there
actually is a manuscript that was intended for publication as a partial
continuation of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.15 The part that
was published consisted of two “books”16 and the manuscript in ques-
tion also contains drafts for additional chapters that were intended as
additions to the second book as well as for a third one.17 The third book
is of interest here because it is devoted to the topic of presentations.
In Brentano’s treatment of presentations one finds two features that
become more and more prominent in Brentano’s lectures during his
Vienna period. The first of these features is his notion of descriptive as
opposed to genetic psychology. The second is the distinction between
the content and object of thought. Let us say a word about each of these
features.
Though the published part of Psychology from an Empirical Stand-
point contains no systematic distinction between descriptive as opposed
to genetic psychology, Brentano says the following at the outset of the
unpublished part of this work concerning presentations:
The task that we have to fulfill regarding presentations is
twofold. We must describe them and state the laws to which
they are subject in their origination and their occurrence.18
This is an explicit statement of the distinction between descriptive and
genetic psychology, though these terms are not yet used here. In Bren-
tano’s lecture course given in 1885/86, entitled Selected Questions from
Psychology and Aesthetics, the first public discussion of the distinction
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in question appears.19 Here Brentano puts forward a descriptive the-
ory of the imagination that had already been sketched out in his draft
for the continuation of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. The
distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology became even
more prominent in three lecture courses given in succession, Descrip-
tive Psychology (1887/88),20 Descriptive Psychology or Phenomenology
(1888/89),21 and Psychognosy (1890/91).22 Though it is impossible to
discuss Brentano’s descriptive psychology (phenomenology or psychog-
nosy) in detail here, a few words on this topic will prove helpful.
Brentano’s mature conception of descriptive psychology consists in
the analysis of consciousness into its elements (i.e. the psychical phe-
nomena belonging to the three distinct classes) and the specification of
their modes of combination.23 Genetic psychology, by contrast, is con-
cerned with the causal origin of psychical phenomena and must rely
heavily on physiology. While Brentano thought that he could deal with
the issues of genetic psychology in his draft of the continuation of Psy-
chology from an Empirical Standpoint, as plainly indicated in the passage
quoted above, he became more and more convinced that physiology had
not reached an adequate level of development for genetic psychology.
He was nonetheless convinced that, in spite of the difficulties involved
in descriptive psychology, he had made contributions not only to this
discipline as such, but also to its application to the branches of practical
philosophy (logic, ethics, and aesthetics) as well as to metaphysics. At
a time when psychology was establishing itself academically as a dis-
cipline independent from philosophy, Brentano’s efforts in his Vienna
period were in fact a thoroughgoing integration of psychology and phi-
losophy.24 While such efforts were hardly appreciated in some circles,
they certainly came to have great impact on his students from this pe-
riod, such as Twardowski, Meinong, and Husserl, but also on earlier
students, such as Stumpf and Marty.
As is well known, Brentano was, from his earliest encounter with
philosophy and onward to his death, very heavily influenced by Aris-
totle.25 Though he parts from Aristotelian doctrines in various ways
(especially in the theory of judgment), Aristotle and Aristotelians are
always among his most respected discussion partners in formulating his
views. For this reason he and his school were sometimes regarded as
“scholastic”, a term typically used in a derogatory sense at the time.
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Aristotle’s influence on Brentano’s descriptive psychology, as we will
see, is of some relevance to Twardowski.
Brentano did not underestimate the difficulties involved in the en-
deavor to analyze consciousness into its elements and to specify their
modes of combination. Such difficulties come poignantly to light when
the differences between philosophers and psychologists regarding con-
sciousness are considered.26 Brentano critically examines views on con-
sciousness that were to be found among his predecessors and contem-
poraries. In responding to these views Brentano is particularly critical
of the division of consciousness into three classes: thinking, feeling,
and willing. This division, which was the dominant one in the German-
speaking world for most of the nineteenth century, was to be replaced
by Brentano with the one he put forward in Psychology from an Empiri-
cal Standpoint and continued to defend for the remainder of his philo-
sophical career. On Brentano’s view, what was called “thinking” is in
fact divided into two classes: presentations and judgments. What was
called feeling and what was called willing are united into one class:
acts of love and hate. This is an aspect of Brentano’s theory that will be
retained by Twardowski. Though theories of judgments were common
among various schools during the late nineteenth century, a theory of
presentations was quite unusual and it may be said to have been one of
the most original aspects of Brentano’s descriptive psychology.27
Now let us turn to the distinction Brentano makes between content
and object. While this distinction is not explicitly made in the pub-
lished part of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and one may
easily get the impression that the distinction in question was first made
by Twardowski and elaborated on by other students of Brentano, the
manuscripts of Brentano give us an entirely different picture. This is a
substantial point and I quote again from the unpublished part of Psy-
chology from an Empirical Standpoint:
We speak of indistinctness of a presentation in two senses,
in a proper one and in an improper one. When we say,
“Objects that we saw in the distance appeared indistinctly
to us”, what we mean is: “The visual presentations that
they caused in us did not allow for a judgment about how
the objects would appear up close, and did not allow us for
this very reason to come to an assured conjecture regarding
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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other peculiarities”. Which content they had may be com-
pletely clear to us. Thus they are indistinct in an improper
sense. In the proper sense, by contrast, we call those pre-
sentations indistinct in which we are unable with assurance
to give an account of the content itself.28
Examples of the distinction that Brentano is making here are not dif-
ficult to cite. We may see an object at a distance and not be able to
make out whether it is a human being or a wax figure. In the content,
however, it is very distinct which colors are presented and how they
are juxtaposed to each other. While it is accordingly evident that Bren-
tano distinguishes between objects and contents of presentations in his
psychology, the way he makes this distinction in his logic is even more
noteworthy and of greater relevance to the topic at hand.
2.2. Presentations in Brentano’s Logic
The lecture course that is of special interest to us here is one that
Brentano first gave in Würzburg and again in Vienna with certain re-
visions and simply entitled Logic (Logik).29 While it has not been de-
termined exactly in which semesters these lectures were held and it is
thus difficult to know if Twardowski actually attended them or not, it
is quite certain that they had considerable impact within Brentano’s cir-
cle of students, including even students from an earlier period, such as
Stumpf and Marty.30 As a student of Brentano during the late 1880s,
Twardowski likewise would have been influenced by the lectures under
consideration here, whether he attended the lectures or not. This will
become clearer as our discussion advances.
What is of special interest in this lecture course is that Brentano
not only distinguishes between contents and external objects, but also
distinguishes between the contents that are characteristic of the various
classes of mental phenomena. He says that a presentation has a content
that is as such different from the content of a judgment and also from a
content of love and hate. Likewise, a judgment has a content that differs
from the content of a phenomenon that belongs to one of the other two
classes. The content of a presentation is called “the presented as such”
(das Vorgestellte als solches).31 The content of a judgment is called “the
judged as such” (das Geurteilte als solches).32
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Brentano approaches the distinction among contents in the course
of his reflection on the expression of mental phenomena in language.
Brentano regards names as appropriate for expressing presentations,
statements (Aussagen) as appropriate for expressing judgments. But
what is the meaning (Bedeutung) of a name? And what is the mean-
ing of a statement? Brentano’s answer to the first question is that the
content of the expressed presentation, the presented as such, as distinct
from the named object, is the meaning of the name.33 In order to sup-
port his point, Brentano makes use of an argument we will find later
in Twardowski and in Husserl, namely that there are cases where two
names have the same object and yet differ in meaning.34 As Brentano’s
own example indicates, the names “the son of Phaenerate” and “the
wisest among the Athenians” both name the same individual, that is
Socrates, but their meanings are different.35
If we now consider Brentano’s thesis of intentional reference in ap-
plication to presentations, it should be taken to mean that every act of
presenting has a content, not that every presentation has an external
object. In this connection Brentano in fact speaks of objectless presen-
tations (gegenstandslose Vorstellungen), though without any reference to
Bernard Bolzano, who had used the term long before him:36
There is no presentation for which something would not
exist intentionally in the mind, but there are objectless pre-
sentations. Also something that is not, indeed something
that cannot be, can be presented.37
The “something existing intentionally in the mind” in this passage is
the content of a presentation or what Brentano calls the intentional or
immanent object. In Brentano’s lecture notes, we find the notion of a
content of a presentation cropping up again and again. Perhaps one of
the most interesting applications of this notion arises when Brentano
comes to distinguish between universal (universell) and individual (in-
dividuell) concepts.38 While the latter are characterized as concepts to
which in each case there corresponds only one object, the former are
characterized as concepts to which there correspond more than one ob-
ject in each case. In this connection he explicitly tells us that a concept
(Begriff) is the same as the content of a presentation. As regards the old
debate between realists and nominalists, he says that the realists were
wrong to regard universals as objects outside the mind. However, he
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says that they were right to regard the status of universality as parallel
to that of individuality. Presumably he thinks that the nominalists were
wrong in this regard. The distinction between universality and individ-
uality for Brentano is restricted to the meanings of names, that is, to
concepts, in other words to the contents of presentations. As a con-
sequence, it would be wrong to say along with Locke that everything
that exists is a particular39 as it would be wrong to embrace full-blown
Platonism.
Now let us turn to Brentano’s conception of the meaning of a state-
ment. Brentano says that the meaning in this case is to be identified
with the content of the expressed judgment, the judged as such, as dis-
tinct from the object designated by the statement.40 While this thesis is
of course highly suggestive, we must be cautious about reading later de-
velopments in the school of Brentano into it. Brentano does not speak
here of propositions, states of affairs, or objectives,41 but simply of the
content of a judgment or the judged as such. In the lecture course on
logic under consideration here Brentano says little more about what he
has in mind here. If, however, we take into account what Brentano
says in the lecture on truth he gave at the Philosophical Society of Vi-
enna in 1889, the contents of judgments turn out to include all sorts
of irrealia, such as a lack, a possibility, or even impossibilities.42 What
makes a judgment about these irrealia true cannot be things in the strict
sense (such as a man or a horse). Moreover, they cannot be the acts of
consciousness, which cohere together in what Brentano calls “physical
phenomena” such as colors, sounds, and the like. Nor can the irrealia
be objects such as Platonic Ideas existing outside of the mind, which
can have no place in any respectable ontology according to Brentano.
The contents of judgment for Brentano at this stage of his philosoph-
ical development are accordingly the only non-things which can take
on the role of truth-makers whenever there are no real things to do so.
However, instead of continuing to develop and elaborate on the notion
under consideration here, he later shifted to a position that no longer
allowed for contents of judgments.43 But as this later position which he
worked out after 1905 apparently had no influence on Twardowski, it
will not be considered further here.
What precedes should have established that Brentano, on the one
hand, distinguished between the contents of presentations and those of
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judgments, that is, between the presented as such and the judged as
such and, on the other hand, assigned to the latter the role of meanings
of names and of statements respectively. Let us now turn to examine
the impact these distinctions had on Twardowski.
3. TWARDOWSKI ON PRESENTATIONS
Twardowski’s most important contribution to philosophy is a short work
that he wrote and published in 1894, while he was still in Vienna, en-
titled On the Content and Object of Presentations.44 This work had con-
siderable impact. In the cases of both Meinong and Husserl the criti-
cal reception of this work, especially with regard to the content-object
distinction, marked an important turning point in their philosophical
developments.45 On the Content and Object of Presentations was Twar-
dowski’s “habilitation thesis” and was written after his doctoral disser-
tation in order to grant him the status of a lecturer. Officially, Brentano
could have directed neither Twardowski’s dissertation46 nor his habili-
tation thesis because at that time Brentano himself was only a lecturer
and not a professor. (After he got married, Brentano had to give up
his professorship in Vienna: he had earlier been ordained and his mar-
riage was impermissible by Catholic standards which prevailed in Aus-
tria at that time.) The professor who officially directed Twardowski’s
dissertation was Robert Zimmermann (to be discussed further below),
who as a young man had been a member of Bernard Bolzano’s circle of
students. While the habilitation thesis was more or less independently
written, it nonetheless had to be approved. As a mere lecturer Brentano
was unable to be involved in any official capacity in Twardowski’s early
philosophical work. Be that as it may, Brentano’s substantial influence
is easily traceable in the habilitation thesis.
3.1. Brentanian Aspects of Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations
The subtitle of Twardowski’s habilitation thesis is “A Psychological In-
vestigation”.47 It is accordingly not meant to be a work in logic, on-
tology, semantics, philosophy of language, or epistemology, but rather
one in the philosophy of mind. From the Brentanian standpoint this
does not make the work unphilosophical. Quite the contrary. According
to Brentano, a “psychological” work understood in the latter sense, es-
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pecially one that is concerned with the fundamental class of psychical
phenomenal, has potential applications in all areas of philosophy.48
Moreover, inasmuch as the work in question is plainly one in the
lineage of Brentanian descriptive psychology, it presupposes that men-
tal phenomena divide into three classes: presentations, judgments, and
acts of love and hate. In Twardowski, these classes are understood as
three different modes of intentional reference. There is, moreover, no
indication of an allegiance to any kind of style of investigation aside
from an empirical one and in particular, the high-minded rationalism
that could be found among the Neo-Kantians at the time is completely
alien to Twardowski. Twardowski’s habilitation thesis is one of the most
extreme cases of “scholasticism” to have come out of Brentano’s school.
That is to say, it is more a product of conceptual analysis than of the
observation of “facts”, either from everyday life or from laboratory ex-
periments. Like Brentano, and though this was by no means the usual
practice among those developing the psychological theories of the time,
Twardowski does not hesitate to cite scholastic philosophers.49 While
these general points are no doubt true, there are, however, two very
specific aspects of Twardowski’s work which exhibit the influence of the
lecture course on logic that Brentano held in Würzburg and again in
Vienna.
The first of these aspects lies in Twardowski’s very explicit distinc-
tion between the contents of presentations and the contents of judg-
ments.50 According to Twardowski, there is a perfect analogy between
presentations and judgments. As acts of consciousness, judgments have
contents and objects as well. While others spoke of contents of judg-
ments, it was unique to Brentano and his followers, including Twar-
dowski, to do so by pointing out this analogy. One can see the differ-
ence here by looking at the way in which Stumpf spoke of the content
of a judgment in his lecture course on logic in 1887. Here Stumpf uses
this term (Urteilsinhalt) as what is meant by the combined names of
a predicative statement (“Sp” in the case of “S is P”) and therefore as
something hardly different from the content of the underlying presen-
tation.51 To be sure, Stumpf was later (within a year’s time no less) to
speak of the content of a judgment in a very different way that exhibited
the influence of the previously discussed lecture course that Brentano
had held in Vienna.52 The point here, however, is that it was Brentano
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who began speaking of contents of judgments as distinct from and yet
analogous to contents of presentations. When Twardowski elaborated
on the contents of presentations and insisted on this analogy, he was
thus, as a member of Brentano’s circle, clearly under the influence of
the master.
One additional remark may be made here regarding Brentano’s in-
fluence on Twardowski’s content-object distinction. It is widely known
that Twardowski regards contents as analogous to pictures.53 Here I
will not discuss how strictly this analogy is to be taken. I wish only
to observe that we find something similar in Brentano’s content-object
distinction as it is made in the unpublished part of Psychology from an
Empirical Standpoint. We have seen that he says therein that in an
improper sense we speak of a presentation being indistinct when we
cannot decide from the content how the object would look close-up.
In that case we are dealing with contents in a sense that is somewhat
analogous to a picture. It is therefore entirely possible that the source
of Twardowski’s picture-analogy is to be found in Brentano’s psychology
as well.
The second way in which Twardowski exhibits the influence of Bren-
tano’s aforementioned lectures on logic lies in his views on presenta-
tions in relation to names.54 Though it was by no means unusual to
speak of contents of consciousness in the late nineteenth century and
even to distinguish them from objects, the characterization of contents
as meanings, more specificially the characterization of contents of pre-
sentations as meanings of names as distinct from the named objects, is a
notion that Brentano introduced. By advocating this view, Twardowski
is once again following in the footsteps of the master. To be sure, he
refers to Anton Marty’s articles “On Subjectless Sentences”, where the
view in question is stated.55 In these articles, however, Marty is likewise
following Brentano regarding meanings as contents.
The influence of Brentano on Twardowski that is being pointed out
here is one that is often understated or completely overlooked by com-
mentators. All too often we get the impression that Brentano used the
terms “content” and “object” interchangeably and Twardowski in fact
went beyond Brentano by making a sharp distinction between content
and object.56 This impression prevails, however, because there tends to
be too much reliance on the published text of Psychology from an Em-
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pirical Standpoint as the source for Brentano’s position. Brentano’s stu-
dents, however, were much more inclined to rely on his lectures, and
often the most recent ones to which they could gain access, whether
they actually attended them, copied the notes from others (as Husserl
often did57), or were informed about them in some other secondhand
manner. This fact will not become as evident as it should be, however,
until Brentano’s lectures are properly edited and published. As things
now stand, researchers of his work and of the work of his students have
little choice but to draw primarily from Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint and a few other works that he published. Whoever relies
on the editions of material that he left unpublished, as they have been
produced thus far, is engaging in research at his own risk.
3.2. The Question of Influence from Others
Twardowski’s habilitation thesis, I claim, including its content-object
distinction, is by and large the result of Brentano’s influence. But to
what extent was Twardowski also influenced by that other towering
figure of Austrian philosophy, namely Bolzano, whom Twardowski re-
peatedly cites and who was later perceived by Brentano as the very one
whose work misguided not only Twardowski, but also Husserl as well
as other students?58 Overall, Twardowski tends to assimilate Bolzano
to Brentano and, by contrast to Husserl, does not seem to see conflicts
between their views.59 Twardowski sees Bolzano’s notion of a presenta-
tion in itself as equivalent to that of the content of a presentation60 and
does not make a big deal about presentations’ being in themselves,
that is to say, independently from the presenting consciousness.61 The
very term “content” suggests quite the opposite, namely that the item
under consideration is as such contained in the presenting conscious-
ness.62 Though this version of the content-object distinction is not the
one Bolzano had in mind, Twardowski nevertheless played an impor-
tant role in the transmission of Bolzanian thought among other students
of Brentano as well as among the Polish logicians.63
According to one commentator, the content-object distinction that
Twardowski develops in his theory of presentations had its origins in
the works of Zimmermann and Benno Kerry.64 While Twardowski cites
both of these authors, this hardly indicates that the distinction in ques-
tion was initially made by them. He tells us, to be sure, that Zimmer-
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mann stresses the need to distinguish between content and object, but
the passages to which he refers in this regard are concerned only with
the contents and objects of concepts (Begriffe).65 Objects in this sense
would simply be the extension of a concept. The concept of man, for
instance, has all individual human beings as its objects, whereas the
content (or, as one could say, intension) of this concept would consist of
whatever is mentioned in the definition of “man”. This distinction, how-
ever, had been standard fare of logic textbooks for a very long time.66 It
is no doubt true that Twardowski wants his content-object distinction
to extend to the intension-extension distinction. Accordingly, he cites
Zimmermann and others who also make the latter distinction as if they
agreed with him. At the same time, however, he goes beyond this dis-
tinction in making the analogy between the content of a presentation
(or the intension of a concept) and the content of a judgment. This is
something that he uniquely gets from Brentano, not from Zimmermann
or apparently from anyone else.
As regards Kerry, it lies far beyond the scope of this paper to en-
ter into a lengthy discussion of his series of articles “On Intuitions and
their Psychical Processing” 67. However, a few points of interest here
may be briefly touched upon. First of all, Kerry does extensively re-
fer to Bolzano and shows considerable appreciation of the notions of
a presentation in itself and a proposition in itself.68 Be this as it may,
these notions, as already pointed out, must not be equated with Twar-
dowski’s notions of contents of presentations and of judgments respec-
tively. Secondly, Twardowski adopts one of Kerry’s arguments for the
content-object distinction, namely that what can be ascribed to an ob-
ject need not be ascribable to the concept of that object (or, in Twar-
dowski’s terms, to the content of the relevant presentation).69 Thirdly,
Twardowski explicitly rejects one of the arguments Kerry makes in fa-
vor of the content-object distinction when considering general presen-
tations.70 This argument was not in fact made by Brentano. Fourthly
and most importantly, whatever one may find in Kerry’s texts, one must
be reminded that he was attending Brentano’s lectures and was also in-
volved in discussions with Brentano’s students.71 His series of articles
“On Intuitions and their Psychical Processing” seems by and large to be
the fruit of his Brentanian education (which was abruptly ended in 1889
due to his untimely death). Therefore, if the content-object distinction
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under consideration was made by Kerry, this in no way eliminates Bren-
tano’s influence from the picture.
Finally, mention should be made of Twardowski’s reference to the
logic textbook that Alois Höfler wrote in collaboration with Meinong.
There the distinction between contents and objects of presentations
is explicitly made72 but there is no mention of the content of a pre-
sentation being analogous to the content of a judgment. In addition,
we should not forget that both Höfler and Meinong were themselves
students of Brentano, in spite of whatever antipathy they might have
shown in reaction to commentators who viewed them as mere disci-
ples.
3.3. Twardowski’ Originality
I do not want to give the impression that Twardowski merely repeats
Brentanian doctrines in his habilitation thesis and was accordingly a
mere disciple. It was indeed a mistake on Husserl’s part, in his manuscript
of 1894 on intentional objects, to think that Twardowski was merely
saying that there are presentations which are indeed without external
objects, but none without intentional objects, that is to say, no pre-
sentations without immanent objects.73 This was in fact the position
of Brentano, who uses the term “objectless presentations”, as already
pointed out, in precisely the way just indicated. Twardowski, by con-
trast, criticizes the thesis that there are objectless presentations.74 To be
sure, he explicitly criticizes Bolzano in this regard, but his criticism ap-
plies to Brentano as well. While the object of a presentation need not be
real or exist in the strict and proper sense, this fact, from Twardowski’s
point of view, does not in any way put into question the objectivity of
the object, so to speak. Accordingly, unicorns and round squares are
indeed objects. On this view it is even permissible to speak of general
objects,75 a notion that was anathema to Brentano. In this regard Twar-
dowski breaks away from Brentano and shows a greater proximity to
the theory of objects which Meinong was later to work out in detail. It
was in fact Twardowski’s habilitation thesis which prompted Meinong
in his article “On Objects of Higher Order”76 to make a sharper distinc-
tion between contents and objects than he had made previously and
thus to bring objects as such into view as the subject matter of a special
discipline distinct from psychology.77 The relation between Twardowski
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and Meinong is yet another one that merits close examination. Suffice
it to say that Twardowski sets out from the standpoint of a Brentanian
descriptive psychology and arrives at a point of view which was cer-
tainly original in 1894 when he published his habilitation thesis. This
originality on Twardowski’s part, however, can only be seen against the
background of those aspects of Brentano’s philosophical work, espe-
cially to be found in his manuscripts, which have been discussed above.
Notes
1 See Smith (1995), pp. 160-195, Poli (1996).
2 For a list of lecture courses that Brentano gave in Vienna, see Werle (1989), pp.
157-162.
3 Brentano Y 4/13: “In Austria nothing had been accomplished in the domain of phi-
losophy in earlier times. Things have become different in recent times. [In Österreich
wurde in früherer Zeit auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie nichts geleistet. In neuerer Zeit
ist das anders geworden]”.
4 For a dscussion of the relationships of Edmund Husserl and of Alexius Meinong to
Brentano, see Rollinger (1999), Rollinger (2004), and Rollinger (2005). An updated
version of the latter study is to appear in Rollinger (2008) under the title “Brentano
and Meinong”. A study of Brentano’s relationship to Anton Marty’s early philosophy of
language is found in Rollinger (2009).
5 While the German term here is translated by some as “idea” and by others as “rep-
resentation”, I still think that “presentation” is the best translation in the context of the
present discussion. While Brentano and Twardowski conceive of Vorstellungen as acts of
consciousness, it is hardly acceptable to speak of an idea as act, indicated by the fact that
only a highly artificial verb (“to ideate”) can be constructed from this term. The verb
“to present” by contrast is very natural. And though it may in some sense be said that
some sort of representation takes place in a Vorstellung, neither Brentano nor Twardowski
conceive of the act of Vorstellen as the medium of representation. It is at best this act’s
content which could be said to be such a medium, i.e. something analogous to a sign or
a picture. For an argument in favour of using the term “representation”, see Hickerson
(this issue).
6 See Brentano (1874), part of which appeared in a second edition in Brentano (1911)
and again posthumously in its entirety in Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1924) and Brentano,
(ed.) Kraus (1925). The texts of both Brentano (1874) and Brentano (1911) are now
available in Brentano, (eds.) Binder and Chrudzimski (2008).
7 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982).
8 Brentano (1874, 256-265).
9 Brentano (1874, 115 ff.); see also Brentano (1889, 14).
10 Brentano (1874, 104-111).
11 Brentano (1874, 276 ff.) Every psychical phenomenon for Brentano is a presenta-
tion of itself. See Brentano (1874, 181): “The question thus arises whether psychical
phenomena, when they are the object of a consciousness, are something of which we are
conscious in one manner or in several. Up to now it has been proven only that they are
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presented . . . ” The entire second chapter of the Brentano’s second book (1874, 101-180)
is to be taken as a proof for this thesis.
12 Brentano (1889, 15).
13 Brentano (1874, 115 f.)
14 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1928).
15 This manuscript is to be found under the quote Ps 53 along with a later one on
psychognosy (a term Brentano apparently did not use until 1889).
16 A “book” in this context is not a “volume”, but rather a block of chapters. Brentano
(1874, v) planned a book on psychology as a science, one on psychical phenomena in
general, one on presentations, one on judgments, one on emotion and will (i.e. love and
hate), and finally one concerned with the mind-body problem and immortality. Only the
first book and part of the second one were published.
17 The unpublished material for the second book, which is concerned with psychical
phenomena in general, consists of chapters on the narrowness of consciousness and ex-
haustion (die Enge des Bewusstseins und Erschöpfung), Bain’s law of relativity and Mill’s
law of the relation to contradictory oppositions (Bains Gesetz der Relativität und Mills
Gesetz der Beziehung auf kontradiktorische Gegensätze), habit (Gewohnheit), and the law
of self-advancement (das Gesetz der Selbstförderung). The unpublished material for the
third book, which is specifically concerned with presentations, consists of chapters on the
indistinctness of presentations (Undeutlichkeit der Vorstellungen), the unity and multiplic-
ity of presentations (Einheit und Vielheit der Vorstellungen), presentations of perception
and imagination (Vorstellungen der Wahrnehmung und Phantasie), intensity of phantasy
presentations and their content (Intensität der Phantasievorstellungen und ihre Fülle), and
a look at the traditional doctrine of the association of ideas (Blick auf die überlieferte Lehre
der Ideenassoziation).
18 Brentano, Ps 53/53002: “Zweifach ist die Aufgabe, die wir hinsichtlich der Vorstel-
lungen zu lösen haben. Wir müssen sie beschreiben und die Gesetze feststellen, welchen
sie in ihrer Entstehung und ihrem Verlaufe unterworfen sind.”
19 Brentano, Ps 58. This material is edited in Brentano, (ed.) Mayer-Hillebrand (1959)
and is very much in need of a re-edition.
20 Brentano, Ps 76.
21 Brentano, Ps 77.
22 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), edited from EL (74), which still
contains unpublished passages.
23 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982, 1 ff).
24 It was of course Wilhelm Wundt’s establishment of a research institute for psychol-
ogy in Leipzig which set the pace for the rest of the academic world. Twardowski in fact
spent some time as a student in Wundt’s institute between receiving his doctorate and
doing his habilitation in Vienna. Brentano, by far the greater influence on Twardowski,
was very critical of Wundt’s experimental psychology, as can be seen from his remarks in
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint concerning Wundt (1874). See Brentano (1874,
85ff, 106ff, 223n). Wundt was no less critical of Brentano and attributed what he re-
garded as the weaknesses in Husserl’s thought to the legacy of Brentano. See Wundt
(1910, 511-634). See also Wundt (1904, 222n). For a discussion of the contrast between
Brentano and Wundt, see Titchener (1929, 1-22) and Rancurello (1968, 78-97). It should
be stressed that Brentano was not in principle opposed to experimental or physiological
psychology. He only thought that it could not achieve anything of significance without
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an adequate descriptive foundation. His most prominent students, even Meinong who
himself established a research institute for psychology in Graz, followed their mentor in
this regard.
25 See George & Koehn (2004).
26 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm, p. 28.
27 Earlier Schopenhauer had published World as Will and Presentation (Welt als Wille
und Vorstellung), but his use of the term has very little in common with the psychological
or logical literature of the later nineteenth century.
28 Brentano, Ps 53/53003. The emphasis on Gegenstand and Inhalt here, as well as
“content” and “object” in the translation, are my own: “Wir sprechen von der Undeut-
lichkeit einer Vorstellung in einem doppelten, einem eigentlichen und uneigentlichen
Sinne. Wenn wir sagen: Gegenstände, die wir in der Ferne sahen, erschienen uns un-
deutlich, so meinen wir damit: Die Gesichtsvorstellungen, die sie in uns erweckten, ges-
tatteten kein Urteil darüber, wie die Gegenstände in der Nähe aussehen würden, und
ließen uns eben darum hinsichtlich anderer Eigentümlichkeiten zu keiner sicheren Ver-
mutung kommen. Welchen Inhalt die Vorstellungen hatten, mag uns dabei vollkommen
klar sein. So sind sie undeutlich nur in uneigentlichem Sinne. Im eigentlichen Sinne un-
deutlich nennen wir dagegen solche Vorstellungen, bei welchen wir uns den Inhalt selbst
nicht mit Sicherheit Rechenschaft zu geben fähig sind.”
29 Brentano EL 80. Here we may note that the lectures under consideration were
poorly edited. In the Mayer-Hillebrand (1956) edition, parts of the lectures are published,
but indifferently mixed up with other texts of Brentano’s and also with notes from his
students.
30 A case can also be made that they influenced Husserl, namely in his distinction be-
tween the noema on the one hand and the object simpliciter on the other (see Husserliana
III/1). This aspect of Husserl’s philosophical development becomes all the more promi-
nent in Husserliana XXXX.
31 Brentano, EL 80/13014.
32 Brentano, EL 80/13020. The lectures under consideration are first and foremost
concerned with judgments and secondarily with presentations. Acts of love and hate or
their contents are hardly touched upon.
33 Brentano, EL/13012-13019.
34 See Twardowski (1894, 31ff) and Husserl (1901, 47).
35 Brentano, EL/13017.
36 Bolzano (1837, vol. I, § 67). Bolzano uses the term gegenstandlos, though few have
followed him in this regard. In another lecture course, entitled Elementary Logic and the
Reforms Necessary in It (EL 72), Brentano did explicitly refer to Bolzano, specifically to
Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the Infinite. He did not refer to Bolzano’s four-volume Theory of
Science, which came to have such a great impact among Brentano’s students.
37 Brentano, EL 80/13016. This passage is from an earlier version of the lecture in
question. The emphasis on gegenstandslose Vorstellungen and the translation thereof is my
own; “Es gibt keine Vorstellung, bei welcher nicht etwas intentional im Geiste existierte,
aber es gibt gegenstandslose Vorstellungen. Auch etwas was nicht ist, ja etwas was gar
nicht sein kann, kann vorgestellt werden.”
38 Brentano, EL 80/13024-13025.
39 An Essay concerning Human Understanding, III.iii.1
40 Brentano, EL 80/13020-13022.
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41 Propositions and states of affairs became important concepts for Husserl, whereas
“objective” is Meinong’s neologism for designating something comparable. For a more
extensive discussion of this topic see the relevant parts of Rollinger (1999). In Dummett
(1991, 250), the question is left open whether Brentano, Husserl, or Meinong fall prey
to criticisms that the author makes of the Fregean concept of a thought (Gedanke). What
is at stake in this concept is its independence from the mind. In this regard it may be
said without hesitation that Brentano does not conceive of contents of judgments in this
manner and is accordingly not susceptible to criticisms which presuppose that they are
conceived of in this manner.
42 See Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1930, 3-29).
43 Brentano (1911, 149) explains that “something other than things, all of which fall
under the concept of the real, does not provide psychical relations with an object”. This
view, “reism”, is elaborated in Brentano (ed.) Kastil (1933) and Brentano, (ed.) Mayer-
Hillebrand (1952). Though it was not accepted by Brentano’s most prominent students,
it became the official doctrine for the next generation of disciples, such as Alfred Kastil,
Oskar Kraus, and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, who accordingly made this standpoint the
basis for editing material from Brentano’s Nachlass. See Kastil (1951). For this reason,
in the attempt to examine Brentano’s philosophical orientation in the Vienna period it is
necessary to make use of unpublished material. It is of interest to note here that, while
Twardowski did not embrace Brentano’s reism, Twardowski’s student Tadeusz Kotarbiński
independently worked out a position that was comparable to the later Brentano’s. See
Smith (1995, 193-246).
44 Twardowski (1894).
45 The relation between Husserl and Twardowski is explored in Schuhmann (1993),
Cavallin (1997), and Rollinger (1999, 139-153).
46 Twardowski (1892).
47 Twardowski (1894, 1). The dissertation, by contrast, is subtitled “An Epistemological
Investigation of Descartes” (Twardowski 1894, 1). The concern with Descartes is by no
means alien to Brentano, who in fact regarded Descartes, along with Locke and Leibniz,
as one of the philosophers of prime interest in the modern period, followed by practically
oriented philosophers (e.g. Berkeley), sceptics (e.g. Hume), and finally mystics (i.e. the
German Idealists). See Brentano (1895, 22ff). Further investigations concerning Bren-
tano’s philosophical work in relation to that of Descartes are certainly to be encouraged,
though hardly possible within the scope of the present paper.
48 As indicated in Cavallin (1997), p. 35, Twardowski “explicitly declares himself to
be an adherent of psychologism” in a manuscript from 1897. This was of course a few
years before Husserl (1900) made “psychologism” a derogatory term. Twardowski’s psy-
chologism, just like Brentano’s, lies in the priority of empirically oriented psychological
investigations in philosophy and the exclusion of all speculations of the kind that had been
rife in Germany during the early nineteenth century (“metaphysicism”). In this sense psy-
chologism was only a further elaboration of Brentano’s thesis, defended in his habilitation
in Würzburg, that the method of philosophy is no different from that of natural science.
See Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1929), p. 147. As a teacher in Lvóv Twardowski became
father of Polish logic, which however was anything but psychologistic in Husserl’s sense.
49 See the references to Suarez and Aquinas in Twardowski (1894, 38) and the refer-
ence to Abelard in Twardowski (1894, 56).
50 Twardowski (1894, 1-9).
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51 Stumpf, Q 14/41.
52 See Rollinger (1999, 313).
53 Twardowski (1894, 12-20).
54 Twardowski (1894, 10ff).
55 See Marty (1884), Marty (1894), and Marty (1895). In Twardowski (1894, 11),
there are explicit references made to Marty (1884, 293; 300).
56 See, for instance, Jacquette (2004a, 111 ff).The same error can most likely be found
in some of my previous work as well.
57 The notes from Brentano’s lecture Selected Psychological Questions (Brentano, Q 9)
were copied by Husserl in Gabelsberger shorthand from another student. As Husserl sug-
gests in (1919, 153), he attended only three of Brentano’s series of lectures on the topic,
namely EL 72, Eth 21, and Ps 58, but he gave 28 notebooks from Brentano’s lectures to
the Brentano Archives in Prague. Though these notebooks were left behind when Bren-
tano’s manuscripts had to be taken out of Czechoslovakia, due to the German invasion
of 1938, and have never been found again, most of the material contained in them must
have been copied from notes of others.
58 Brentano & Bergmann, (ed.) Bergmann (1946/47, 125 f).
59 Rollinger (1999, 69-82).
60 Twardowski (1894, 17), where Bolzano (1837, I, § 49) is cited.
61 What motivated this assimilation may have been Bolzano’s characterization of pre-
sentations in themselves as the “material” (Stoff) of subjective presentations and of propo-
sitions in themselves as the “material” of judgments. See Bolzano (1837, I, § 48) and
Bolzano (1837, III, § 291). Bolzano, however, apparently uses this peculiar term only for
lack of a better word. He does, to be sure, see an analogy between presentations and
judgments, but it is not entirely the same as Brentano’s or Twardowski’s. The fact that
it is not anything transcendent to consciousness, but rather the contents of presentations
and judgments which are at stake, is for them the crucial point.
62 We see the same sort of mistake occurring again in Stumpf (1907, 29f)., where states
of affairs (Sachverhalte), explicitly conceived of as contents of judgment and indeed im-
manent to consciousness, are equated with Bolzanian “propositions in themselves” (Sätze
an sich).
63 Morscher (2008, 155f).
64 Poli (1996, 210 n).
65 Zimmermann (1867, § 18; § 20) as cited in Twardowski (1894, 17).
66 The Port Royal logic was of great importance in calling attention to this distinction.
See Arnauld & Nicole, (trans.) anonymous (1693), Part One, Chapter Three. See also
Kneale & Kneale (1984, 318 f).
67 Kerry (1885), Kerry (1886), Kerry (1887), Kerry (1889), Kerry (1890a), and Kerry
(1891).
68 See especially Kerry (1891).
69 Kerry (1886, 428), as cited in Twardowski (1894, 30).
70 Kerry (1886, 432), as cited in Twardowski (1894, 34).
71 Höfler (1892).
72 Höfler & Meinong (1890, § 6) as cited in Twardowski (1894, 4).
73 This manuscript has been translated into English as Appendix One of Rollinger (1999,
251-284). The best edition of the German text can be found in Husserl & Schuhmann,
(ed.) Schuhmann (1990/91). An earlier edition is found in (Husserliana XXII, 303-348).
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Though Husserl misunderstands Twardowski’s position, much of his argument still has
bearing on the proto-Meinongian view that Twardowski develops and consequently on
the Meinongian thesis that it is possible for something not to exist (or subsist) and still to
be an object.
74 Twardowski (1894, 20-29).
75 Twardowski (1894, 102-111).
76 Meinong (1899). See Chrudzimski (2007, 103-118).
77 The full-blown statement in favor of object theory came as late as 1904. See Meinong
(1904a). Though Twardowski was thus Meinong’s predecessor in this regard by ten years,
it should also be kept in mind that Meinong repeatedly insisted that the seeds of object
theory were already in his earlier writings. Moreover, he was not entirely pleased with
the way in which Twardowski made the distinction between content and object. See the
quote from a letter from Meinong to Cornelius (6 October 1899) in Rollinger (1993, 70
n).
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